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1. INTRODUCTION
The copyright laws of both the United States' and Great Britain'
grant to a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute
or display the copyrighted work or to prepare derivative works based
on the copyrighted work. There is, however, a limitation on the rights
of the copyright owner; this limitation is called "fair use" in the United
States and "fair dealing" in Britain. The doctrine is similar in both
jurisdictions. In particular, the Copyright Act of 1976 codifies some of
the usages that the common law has considered to be fair use, such as
reproduction of a work for purposes of criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching or scholarship.' Parody is regarded as a type of criti-
cism that falls under the rubric of fair use.
Both the United States and the British courts have generally rec-
ognized the legitimacy of a parody defense to allegations of copyright
infringement. On November 29, 1983, however, Judge Falconer in the
Chancery Division of the English High Court of Justice denied the
legitimacy of the parody defense to Wellingtons Ltd., the maker of a
* This comment is nominated for the International Law Students Association's
Francis 0. Deak Award.
** J.D. Candidate, 1990, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.Phil., 1987,
New York University; B.A., 1981, Reed College. In memory of my father.
*** HORACE, SATIRES, Bk. ii, sat. 1, 1. 86 (H.R. Fairclough trans.) (London
1961). Said of any question which only succeeds in raising general laughter, and is so
dismissed, or "laughed out of court."
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
2 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, reprinted in 11 HAISBURY'S STAT-
TrrEs (4th ed. 1985). On November 15, 1988 the Copyright Act of 1956 was repealed
in toto by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, ch. 48. The definition of
"fair dealing" in the 1988 Act does not, however, moot the argument made herein
concerning the validity of a common law parody defense it Britain.
' Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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"Schlurppes Tonic Bubble Bath." An injunction was granted to the
plaintiff, Schweppes Ltd., on a motion for summary judgment.' Until
this decision, the parody defense had been upheld against allegations of
copyright infringement in Britain.5
The decision in Schweppes Ltd. v. Wellingtons Ltd. has several
negative implications. First, holders of a copyright in their trademark6
will be virtually immune from satiric7 parody in Britain, thus shielding
them from a socially beneficial and entertaining form of criticism.
Second, the British consumer public will be denied a humorous
type of commercial product. Gag gifts which poke fun at a consumer-
oriented and status-preoccupied society by mocking a "serious" type of
consumer product through parody will become rare in Britain. "Paro-
dists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied.
Self-esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permis-
sion even in exchange for a reasonable fee."8 In the United States, the
parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possi-
ble a use that generally cannot be bought.'
While "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
tively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
the owner of the copyright,"1 it is important to recognize that "[t]he
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring
" Schweppes Ltd. v. Wellingtons Ltd., 1984 Fleet Street Rep. 210 (Ch. 1983).
" Joy Music, Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers, Ltd., [1960] 2 Q.B. 60 (hold-
ing that the copyright of the song "Rock-a-Billy" was not infringed by a newspaper
parody entitled "Rock-a-Phillip Rock!" The court found that defendants had contrib-
uted sufficient independent labor to make the parody an original work).
6 For more on the relevance of trademark issues, see infra notes 81-121 and ac-
companying text.
"Satire, according to Juvenal's useful if hackneyed formula, has an interest in
anything men do." N. FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 229 (1971).
"Two things.., are essential to satire; one is wit or humor ... the other is an object of
attack." Id. at 224.
I Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use Af-
ter Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1397 n.12 (1984).
9 See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[C], at 13-90.10 (1989);
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982), reprinted in 30
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 253 (1983) (discussing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Plaintiffs were composers of a song released and copyrighted in the 1950's entitled
"When Sonny Gets Blue." Attorneys for the defendant, Rick Dees, contacted the plain-
tiffs to obtain permission to record a parody of the aforementioned song. The plaintiffs
refused to consent. Soon thereafter, the defendant released a recording entitled, "When
Sonny Sniffs Glue." The court found that the appropriation was fair use). See also,
Neterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commen-
tary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 233 (1962) (one copyright owner licensed a parody of his
work for a rumored $100,000).
10 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors."' 1 British copyright law, too, was derived not so
much to promote the good of the author as from "the fundamental no-
tion that no one person should be able to compete unfairly against an-
other by appropriating the fruits of his intellectual labour."' 2 In addi-
tion, "[t]he granting of such exclusive rights [i.e. copyright], under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly."'" Thus, the ultimate aim
of the copyright laws is to benefit the public interest. Leaving questions
of personal taste aside, the humor of parody benefits the public and is
an exercise of freedom of expression.
Finally, the parody defense has been litigated in copyright cases of
the United States,' 4 Canada' 5 and Great Britain.'" Other European
countries such as France' and Germany'" have also had the "fair use"
11 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (Chief Justice Hughes
referring to the copyright monopoly granted by Congress).
12 J. PHILLIPS, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 106
(1986)(quoting Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, at 2334-35).
IS H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
14 In the United States, an element of humor aimed at some aspect of the copy-
righted material is a requirement for the defendant to justify a parody defense. See
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Judge
Stanton held that an advertisement for the movie "Moscow on the Hudson" that copied
the well known Steinberg illustration for the New Yorker of a bird's eye view across
Manhattan past the Hudson was infringement because no element of humor was aimed
at the illustration itself). See also infra note 88.
"5 See, e.g., ATV Music Publishing of Canada Ltd. v. Rogers Radio Broadcasting
Ltd., 35 O.R.(2d) 417 (1982) (injunction issued against a parody of the Lennon and
McCartney song "Revolution"-"You say you want a constitution/Well Trudeau/
Will it really change the World/Provinces you know aren't certain/Alberta's not third
world"). See also Braithwaite, From Revolution to Constitution: Copyright, Compul-
sory Licences and the Parodied Song, 18 U. BRIT. COL. L. REv. 35 (1984).
16 See infra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
1 For commentary on a French case of 1934 involving a parody of the
"Toreador" air from "Carmen" (Jugement du Tribunal de Commerce de Ia Seine le
26 juin 1934), see H. DESBOIS, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 321-23 (1978) (the
parody of a couple measures from "Carmen" sung in an operetta was held not to be
infringement). The French law with regard to parody is as follows: "Lorsque l'oeuvre
a & divulge, l'auteur ne peut interdire... la parodie, la pastiche la caricature compte
tenu des lois du genre." ["Once the work has been published, the author may not
forbid ... parody, pastiche or caricature according to the applicable laws." (my trans-
lation)]. Loi no. 57-298 du 11 Mars 1957 sur la propri&t litt~raire et artistique, Art.
41, 1.4.
"8 The German equivalent of the fair use defense isfreie Benutzung. For refer-
ences to the parody defense in German law see, E. HEFTI, DIE PARODIE IM URHEBER-
RECHT (1977); Vinck, Parodie und Urheberschutz, 1973 GEWERBLICHER REcrr-
SCHLITZ UND URHEBERRECHT [hereinafter GRUR] 251. See also G. SCHRICKER,
URHEBERRECHT: KOMMENTAR (1987). Some German cases involving the parody de-
fense are the following: Judgment of Nov. 15, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof, GRSZ, W.
Ger., 26 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 52 (Concerning a movie called
"The Man who was Sherlock Holmes" about a man who dressed up like Sherlock
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defense of parody used in copyright cases. In addition, the Japanese
Supreme Court considered a parody defense in a recent case. 9 Despite
similarities in the cases involving a parody defense, there is no common
rule of law that governs all of the above-mentioned countries. Never-
theless, the copyright laws of the United States and Britain have been
similar for most of this century. Indeed, British courts have looked to
United States case law for direction in copyright cases.2° By denying
the validity of the parody defense, Britain's concept of "fair dealing"
has become dissimilar to the concept of "fair use" 21 in the copyright
law of the United States. This result is incongruous because the British
and United States copyright statutes are very similar.
The United States experience demonstrates that the parody de-
fense (1) is consistent with the provisions of the copyright statute;"2 (2)
Holmes as a disguise when he committed crimes, the court held that there was no
substantial similarity since the audience knew the character was not the original char-
acter Sherlock Holmes and that the work was a new work of original authorship.);
Judgment of Mar. 26, 1971, Landgericht, Berlin, 1971 GRUR 588 (Court held there
was infringement by a satirical magazine that had reproduced the Disney characters in
a comic strip called "Wouldn't it be nice if Disney was colorized." The court reasoned
that parody does not give free access to copyrighted material and that free speech is
limited by the German copyright statute § 24(1) of the Urheberrechtsgesetz); Judgment
of Dec. 13, 1972, 1974 GRUR 231 (A parody of the Marlene Dietrich song "Von
Kopf bis Fup" (about Ulricke Baader-Meinhof) published in "Bild" held to be in-
fringement because the parody was not aimed at the work parodied).
The Federal Republic of Germany Copyright Statute is available in English
translation in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WO4LD (Supp. 1984-86).
The official German text of the Urheberrechtsgesetz is published in 1965 Bundesgesetz-
blatt, Teil 1, 1273.
11 The case involved defendant's parodic montage composition based on a popular
photograph taken by the plaintiff. Judgment of Nov. 20, 1972,.K sai (District Court),
Japan, 639 HANJI 57 (finding infringement due to defendant making a modification
work and not merely quoting), rev'd, Judgment of May 19, 1976, Ksai (High Court),
Japan, 815 HANJI 21 (reversing district court because defendant quoted work to ex-
press his own thought and criticism), rev'd, Judgment of March 28, 1980, Saikosai
(Supreme Court), Japan 967 HANJI 45 (reversing on grounds that, "although the
quoted work became different by quotation, the essential characteristics of the original
work can still be perceived."). The original photograph was of a mountain side with
skiers seen from a distance. The defendant added (through the technique of photo mon-
tage) a huge tire that appeared to be rolling down after the skiers. The Tokyo High
Court recognized that the defendant "intended... to satirize the current world. . ....
Sugiyama, The First Parody Case in Japan, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 285, 286
(1987).
20 See, e.g., the reference to Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (1964) in
the English case Williamson Music Ltd. v. The Pearson Partnership Ltd., 1987 Fleet
Street Rep. 97, 103-04 (Ch. 1986) (quoting Judge Kaufman's proposition that "parody
and satire are deserving of substantial freedom" (italics in original), but denying the
parody defense to the defendant by relying on the holding of Schweppes Ltd. v. Wel-
lingtons Ltd., 1984 Fleet Service Rep. 210 (Ch. 1983)).
2 For more on the meaning of "fair use" and "fair dealing" see supra text ac-
companying notes 122-33.
22 Britain and the United States share a common statute of "fair dealing" or "fair
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allows for freedom of expression13 for the producer of the parody, for
the public and for the consumer; and, (3) does not prevent those whose
work has been infringed for purely commercial reasons from being pro-
tected from harm.24 Where there is no direct competition with the orig-
inal, the social value of parody25 outweighs the copyright holder's inter-
use" in their respective copyright acts. Section 6(2) of the British statute provides the
meaning of statutory "fair dealing": "No fair dealing with a literary . . . work shall
constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work if it is for purposes of criticism
or review. . . ." The Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, reprinted in 11
HALSBURY'S STATUTES (4th ed. 1985). Case law in Britain has looked to § 49 of the
Copyright Act of 1956 (which states the requirement that in order to find an infringe-
ment "a substantial part" of the copyrighted material must be reproduced) in support
of a common law parody defense.
In the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) provides the statutory definition of
"fair use." The House Report to the law states that the section "is intended to restate
the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way" and that the fair use doctrine is an "equitable rule of reason." H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 65, 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5659, 5680.
2" Britain recognizes the importance of free speech with regard to "fair dealing."
"[I]njunctions should not in general be used to restrain free speech." Kennard v. Lewis,
1983 Fleet Street Rep. 346 (Ch.)(members of. the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
were denied an injunction against The Coalition for Peace through Security whose
pamphlet entitled "30 Questions and Honest Answers about CND" had a substantially
similar layout to plaintiffs' pamphlet "30 Questions and Answers about CND").
In general, the issue of free speech is distinct from the issue of "fair use." In a
copyright case a court will look first to the issue of whether or not infringement of a
copyrighted work is "fair use" before considering the constitutional issue of free speech.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Bren-
nan, J. concurring) (copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as copy-
right protects only form of expression and not the ideas expressed).
24 The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized that the commercial
factor of 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). See
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). In deciding Fisher, the court analyzed
the first, third and fourth fair use factors. First, the court found that the value of the
original would not be decreased. Second, since the parody would not fulfill the demand
for the original, it did not infringe upon plaintiff's copyright. Finally, as to the amount
taken, the court recognized that the "conjure up" principle may be unfair if not applied
in a flexible manner and held that the appropriation of the plaintiff's song was fair use.
Id. at 437-40.
15 While the social value of "Schlurppes Tonic Bubble Bath" is minimal, the
principle involved is extremely valuable to the public interest. The parody of a label
may seem of significantly less value than parody of a literary work, but the principle is
the same. Indeed, it is a central doctrine to the law of copyright that the "merit" of a
work is not to be decided by the courts, but simply that if the work is "original" then it
is copyrightable. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ("A
picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used
for an advertisement." Id. at 251). Following this doctrine, once something has been
copyrighted it is capable of being parodied; no issue of "merit" is involved. If the par-
ody adds something original to the underlying work and does not directly compete with
it, then (this Comment argues) the parody defense is legitimate.
Trademarks and labels are a form of advertising and become at times part of
general public knowledge. Some labels and trademarks have even achieved a type of
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est in protecting the copyrighted material from being imitated in a
parody. Parody is a legitimate and fair use of copyrighted material even
if the parody has commercial value-such as the commercial value
Schlurppes Tonic Bubble Bath would have had to Wellingtons
Ltd.-as long as there is no injury or commercial harm done to the
copyright holder. "[I]n today's world of unrelieved solemnity, copyright
law should be hospitable to the humor of parody."26
2. THE SCHWEPPFS DECISION
The "fair dealing" defense of parody was dealt a heavy blow in
Britain by Judge Falconer in Schweppes Ltd. v. Wellingtons Ltd.27 In
Schweppes, the plaintiffs held a copyright on their yellow and gold la-
bel28 bearing the royal arms and the word SCHWEPPES; this label
was placed on their tonic water bottles. The defendants placed a similar
label which bore the word SCHLURPPES on their bottles of "tonic
bubble bath." This action by the defendants "was intended as a joke,
their labels being parodies of the plaintiffs' labels. The plaintiffs, who
did not share the defendants' point of view, commenced proceedings for
inter alia copyright infringement and sought summary judgment
against the defendants under Order 14.' '29 Judge Falconer held for the
artistic stature and become part of the national culture. The American Advertising Mu-
seum of Portland, Oregon which opened in 1986 offers a display of some of the better
known labels and trademarks of the United States.
28 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1980) (affg per curiam 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)) ("I love New York" sung
by Saturday Night Live actors as "I Love Sodom" held to be fair use because the
parody did not affect the value of plaintiff's song).
27 1984 Fleet Street Rep. 210 (Ch. 1983).
28 Copyrights are granted to trademark labels in both Britain and the United
States. See Charles Walker & Co. v. The British Picker Co., 1961 R.P.C. 57 (holding
that a label is an artistic work); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) (a label
which is not purely descriptive may be made the subject of copyright); Drop Dead Co.
v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding copyright on
PLEDGE label valid); see generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239 (1903); Pattishall, Protection of Labels Through Copyright Infringement and
Unfair Competition Laws, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 408 (1966). A mere name, however,
does not qualify for copyright protection. In Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants
Ltd., [1982] Ch. 119, the argument that EXXON might be protected by copyright was
rejected on two grounds: 1) nothing could be a literary work unless it conveyed infor-
mation, provided instruction or gave pleasure; and 2) EXXON is a name and since
other statutory protection exists for the protection of names the Copyright Act of 1956
could not be taken to have been intended to provide protection for 'denominative
works'. This decision is criticized by Phillips who states that, contrary to the court's
reasoning, a name is information and there is no legal principle that deprives copyright
protection to a symbol registered as a trademark. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 119.
29 Schweppes, 1984 Fleet Street Rep. at 210. Order 14 of the Rules of the Chan-
cery Court in Britain is a proceeding for summary judgment. "[T]o succeed under Or-
der 14 the plaintiff must not only be able to prove his claim clearly, but, if a defence is
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plaintiffs by considering a single issue: "Has there been a reproduction
in the defendant's work of a substantial part of the plaintiff's work?"'
The Judge rejected defendant's defense that the plaintiff's work had
been altered by way of parody.
The fact that the defendant in reproducing his work may
have himself employed labour and produced something origi-
nal, or some part of his work which is original, is beside the
point if none the less the resulting defendant's work repro-
duces without the licence of the plaintiff a substantial part of
the plaintiffs work.3"
As one commentator has pointed out, the decision of Judge Falconer
"would appear to leave no scope whatever for a 'parody' defence in
copyright law. It is thus unlikely that the question whether there has
been a parody will ever be determinative of copyright infringement
liability.13 2
Despite this recent holding of the British courts the parody defense
is a legitimate affirmative defense to allegations of trademark or copy-
right infringement. Many aspects of the parody defense were not dis-
cussed in the adjudication of Schweppes by Judge Falconer. The fol-
lowing issues merit a more extensive analysis: (1) the difference
between trademark and copyright,3 (2) the significance of competition
put in, [he] must satisfy the court that it is not a bona fide defence." Williams &
Humbert Ltd. v. International Distillers & Vintners Ltd., 1986 Fleet Street Rep. 150,
151.
In the United States, "[siumnary judgment is often disfavored in copyright cases,
for courts are generally reluctant to make subjective comparisons and determinations."
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
citing Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980),
citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946).
SO Schweppes, 1984 Fleet Street Rep. at 212.
31 Id. For the sake of simplicity, English spelling that differs from United States
spelling has simply been retained without placing [sic] after the word.
32 Comment, The "Parody" Defence to Copyright Infringement, 1984 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 245, 247.
3' Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (enjoining defendant from manufacturing "Gizmo" products which violated
Warner Brothers' copyright). Warner Bros. provides a good general description of the
differences between copyright and trademark:
There is a great difference between the objective of trademark protection
and the objective of copyright protection. The two legal doctrines are dis-
tinct, different, and separate.
The objective of trademark protection is to protect the maker of goods
and the public from confusion as to the origin of goods where confusion is
caused by the use of false and counterfeit trademarks. A trademark shows
the origin of goods. The word 'counterfeit' is used in the statutory law of
trademarks. (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1116(d)(1)(A), 1127). To use a
false trademark is to misrepresent the origin of goods, to 'sail under false
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in a common market, (3) the legal principles of dilution and disparage-
ment, and (4) most importantly, the validity from a public interest
viewpoint, of a parody "fair dealing" defense. The facts of Schweppes
offer a springboard for the discussion of these issues.
The parody of trademarks is an important counter-balance to the
power that these symbols have over consumers and the public in gen-
eral. Parody serves the public interest by ridiculing the power of these
symbols, by achieving a provocative effect and by producing laughter."'
3. THE PARODY DEFENSE IN BRITISH COPYRIGHT LAW
3.1 Early Case Law in Great Britain
In the English case of Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace,35 which im-
plicitly involved the parody defense, the plaintiff was an artist whose
paintings had been imitated in tableaux vivants.16 The artist brought
infringement actions against a newspaper for printing sketches of the
theaters' performances. The Court of Appeals stated that copyrights are
not "to be made instruments of oppression and extortion"3 and held
that there was no possibility of confusion since the defendant's sketch
was "a work of a different class, intended for a different purpose"38
than the plaintiff's work. In dictum the Court added: "The amusing
sketches in Punch of the pictures in the Royal Academy are not, in my
opinion, infringements of the copyrights in these pictures, although
colors.'
The objective of copyright protection is to encourage the creator of an
original work in a medium of expression-such as literature, music, art
and the like. The encouragement is by giving the creator the exclusive
right 'to reproduce' the work, 'to prepare derivative works', 'to distribute
copies or phonorecords', 'to perform' the work, and 'to display' the work
(17 U.S.C. § 106). A copyright does not show the origin of goods; that is
not its purpose. The word 'counterfeit' does not appear in the statutory
law of copyrights.
Id. at 760 (emphasis in original).
34
Laughter has a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential forms
of the truth concerning the world as a whole, concerning history and man;
it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the world is seen anew,
no less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from the serious
standpoint.... Certain essential aspects of the world are accessible only to
laughter.
M. BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND His WORLD 66 (Iswolsky trans. 1968).
s [1894] 3 Ch. 109.
36 Scenes "presented on stage by costumed actors who remain silent and motion-
less as if in a picture." [French, "living pictures."] AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1236 (1982).
17 Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. at 128.
38 Id. at 132.
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probably made from the pictures themselves. . . [For] there is no
piracy, actual or intended." 9
In Tate v. Fulbrook,4° the English Court considered the issue of
whether or not the public would be deceived (an issue more often dis-
cussed in trademark than copyright infringement cases in the United
States). There the Court of Appeals noted in dictum that, "[plarody is
permissible, but then, parody shows at the very time that it is [imitat-
ing] that it is an imitation, it shows the difference as well as the
resemblance."
41
The holding in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co.42 demonstrates
the significance of the amount of the original work used in the dispute.
The case involved copyright infringement by a filmmaker of Elinor
Glyn's novel Three Weeks, which portrayed an act of adultery in an
attractive light. The court in Glyn held that the amount of the taking
was not substantial and the Judge wrote, in obiter dictum, that "no
infringement of the plaintiff's rights takes place where a defendant has
bestowed such mental labour upon what he has taken and has subjected
it to such revision and alteration as to produce an original result. ' 43
3.2 The Copyright Act of 1956 and Its Application by the British
Courts
The English Copyright Act of 1956 provides that the reproduction
of a work for the purpose of a finding of copyright infringement means
the reproduction of "a substantial part of the [original] work." 44 This
provision was applied by the English Court in the case of Joy Music,
Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920), Ltd.45
In joy Music, the owners of the copyright to the song "Rock-a-
Billy" claimed their copyright was infringed by a parody entitled
"Rock-a-Phillip Rock!" published by the defendant newspaper. The
court held that the defendants had not reproduced "a substantial part"
11 Id. at 130. See Note, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 550, 555 (1966).
40 98 L.T.R. 706 (C.A. 1908) (holding that defendant's drama "is not parody but
an imitation" of plaintiff's drama).
41 Id. at 706.
42 [1916] 1 Ch. 261 (while the court held that the plaintiff's action failed because
her work was immoral and indecent and therefore not entitled to protection of the
court, obiter dicta suggests that a parody can never infringe the copyright in the paro-
died work (per Younger J., at 268)). See J. Phillips, Elinor Glyn and the "Three
Weeks" Litigation, 12 EUR. INT. PROP. REV. 336 (1982).
43 [1916] 1 Ch. at 268 (emphasis added).
44 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 49(1). For commentary, see 11
HALSBURY'S STATUTES § 49(1) at 316 (4th ed. 1985).
45 [1960] 2 Q.B. 60, 27 1 All E.R. 703.
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of the plaintiff's song and that the defendant had demonstrated suffi-
cient independent labor to make the parody an original work.46 Relying
on Glyn, the Court found that the parody of the song had its origin in
the work parodied, but did not amount to reproduction of such a sub-
stantial part of that work as to amount to an infringement.
Professor Jeremy Phillips, an English scholar, criticizes the Joy
Music holding and supports the decision in Schweppes.
A parody is a work which consciously mimics and "sends
up" the form of another work, while its content may be en-
tirely different. Should the fact that the original work and its
parody are aimed at different audiences and fulfil different
aesthetic functions excuse the parody from being stigmatized
as a copyright infringement? At one time it was thought4"
that no infringement was committed if the amount of effort
and skill which the parodist expended upon his work was so
great that the parody could be regarded as an original work
in its own right. This view, which was only obiter, was
founded upon the misapprehension that a work was either
an original work or an infringing one. Since a work can be
both original and infringing4" it is not surprising that, in
Schweppes Ltd v. Wellington,4 Falconer, J. held that par-
ody could not of itself affect the question of infringement:
either a substantial part of a work was copied or it was
not.50
Contrary to the view expressed by Professor Phillips, where there
is a significant element of originality in the parody, especially where
free speech issues are concerned, a parody may copy even a 'substantial'
part of the original work and still not be an infringement of copyright
law.
3.3 The Element of Originality
United States and British courts deciding copyright and trademark
cases should recognize the importance of originality in deciding whether
18 English law until the Schweppes case was in fact not unfavorable to the parody
defense. It is the Schweppes case that changed the law in this area. One commentator
remarked shortly after the Joy decision that "[tihe present English law then, affords the
parodist ... considerable freedom." Note, supra note 39, at 558.
47 Joy Music Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd., [1960] 2 Q.B. 60, 27 1
All E.R. 703.
4B See Warwick Films Ltd. v. Eisinger, [1969] 1 Ch. 508.
4 1984 Fleet Street Rep. 210 (Ch. 1983).
'o J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 144.
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or not a parody is to be adjudicated as an infringement. The problem is
that a parody is by definition at least partly imitative of the original.5"
The key question is whether or not the defendant produced an original
result in the parody.
A parody has a different theme, tone, artistic quality, genre, form
and intended audience than the work it imitates. A parody mimics the
style of the original at the same time that it holds it up to ridicule.
Thus, one substantial difference that may exist between a parody and
the original is an element of satire, humor, irony or comedy. If no such
comic intent was apparent in the original, then there is a substantial
difference between it and the parody. The British Court recognized this
element in Carlton v. Mortimer.
52
In Carlton, the defendant's parody of Edgar Rice Burroughs'
Tarzan novel was an acrobatic show entitled, "Warzan and his Apes."
While the defendant had copied two incidents from the novel, the Court
found that "[i]n the book both these [incidents] were serious, perhaps
they might be described as sentimental. In the defendant's performance
they were both comic to the last degree. They were intended to be
comic and produce nothing but laughter. '5' Having distinguished be-
tween comic and serious intent, the court held for the defendant.
A British court recently denied defendant's use of a parody defense
in Williamson Music, Ltd. v. Pearson Partnership, Inc. 54 In consid-
ering a parody of the song "There is Nothin' Like a Dame" from Rog-
ers & Hammerstein's "South Pacific" used in an advertisement for
Rapide Coach Service, 55 Judge Baker followed the test used in Schwep-
pes.5' The plaintiffs' motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted
and the defendants were prevented from showing the commercial.
51 One other problem posed by parody is that § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976
provides that the right to produce "derivative works," which a parody may well be, is
an exclusive right of the holder of the copyright in the original work.
52 See E. MACGILLIVRAY, COPYRIGHT CASES 1920, at 194-96 (1921). See also
Note, supra note 39, at 556-57.
5 E. MAcGILLIVRAY, supra note 52, at 195.
1987 Fleet Street Rep. 97 (Ch. 1986).
55 The original words "We got sunlight on the sand/We got moonlight on the
sea/We got mangoes and bananas/We can pick right off the tree" were parodied by'
the phrase "We got coffee, we got tea,/We've got toilets if need be/We've got films on
vi-de-o,/so there's lots for you to see." Id. at 98-99.
56 "The sole test is whether the defendant's work has reproduced a substantial
part of the plaintiff's ex hypothesi copyright work." Williamson Music, Ltd. v. The
Pearson Partnership, Ltd., 1987 Fleet Service Rep. 97, 106 (Ch. 1986) (quoting
Schweppes Ltd. v. Wellingtons Ltd., 1984 Fleet Street Rep. 210, 212 (Ch. 1983)).
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3.4 British Courts' Reliance on United States Copyright Law
In considering the possibility of a parody defense, the British court
in Williamson Music referred to the United States case of Berlin v.
E.C. Publications.57 However, the British court used a more stringent
test than that used in the United States case.
The case of Berlin v. E.C. Publications was brought in response
to Mad Magazine's publication of parodies of Irving Berlin songs. The
Second Circuit held that there was no infringement since the theme and
content of the parodies differed markedly from those of the originals. 58
Judge Kaufman remarked that "[a]s a general proposition, we believe
that parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as
entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism" and held
that the test is whether or not the parody is a "creative effort possessing
distinctive literary qualities worthy of judicial protection in the public
interest." 9 Unlike the United States court's decision in Berlin, the
British court in Williamson Music found that the Rogers and Ham-
merstein estates' refusal to authorize the use of their works in television
advertisements was more significant than the value of parody as a form
of entertainment to the public interest. Authorization, however, should
not be required for a "fair dealing" such as parody.
The British court looks at United States law for direction regard-
ing "fair use." In the United States, the parody defense has gained
recognition as a legitimate aspect of the "fair use" doctrine. Judge
Kaufman's decision in Berlin stresses that there is indeed a public in-
terest in allowing parody to exist without being judicially enjoined. 0
On the other hand, the decisions of the British Court in the Schweppes
and Williamson Music cases have denied the parody defense, and have
thus severely limited the availability of entertaining and satirical paro-
dies. For the purpose of consistency between United States and British
law, and because the parody defense is a valid defense even to a sub-
1 219 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964) (holding that Mad Magazine's parodies of Irving Berlin songs
were not infringements of copyright).
8 For example, the words of Irving Berlin, "Blue Skies/Smiling at me/Nothing
but Blue Skies/Do I see" were parodied by the line "Blue Cross/Had me agree/To a
new Blue Cross/Policy!" 219 F. Supp. at 913 n.1.
329 F.2d at 543-45.
80 Mad Magazine's songs were indeed parodies. Judge Kaufman called them sat-
ires perhaps to avoid overturning Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F.
Supp, 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1957) (Doug-
las, J. abstaining), reh'g. denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958) (Loew's had the motion picture
rights for "Gas Light." Jack Benny produced a parody of "Gas Light." The court held
that a substantial amount of material was taken and denied the fair use defense).
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stantial reproduction of a protected work, the parody defense should be
upheld.6"
4. THE PARODY DEFENSE IN UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW
The parody defense in the United States has gained legitimacy de-
spite the early decision of Judge Carter in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System. 2 In Loew's, plaintiff had the motion picture
rights for "Gas Light." Jack Benny produced "Autolight," a CBS tele-
vision show parody of "Gas Light." The court ruled that a substantial
amount of material had been taken and that, in spite of the "fair use"
defense, consent was required from the copyright holder. The court
stated:
One cannot copy the substance of another's work without in-
fringing his copyright. A burlesque presentation of such a
copy is no defense to an action for infringement of copyright.
... [A] parodized or burlesqued taking is treated no differ-
ently from any other appropriation .... [I]f it is determined
that there was a substantial taking, infringement exists."3
Insisting that his decision did not sound the "death knell on bur-
lesque," ' 4 Judge Carter asserted in dicta that there is plenty of material
in the public domain available for parody.65 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Carter's decision.
Judge Carter's views changed in a subsequent parody case,
namely, Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.66 This
case involved a burlesque of "From Here to Eternity" entitled "From
61 See infra text accompanying notes 122-42.
61 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43
(1957) (Douglas, J. abstaining), reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
6' 239 F.2d at 537 (quoting partly from 131 F. Supp. at 183). While this holding
is similar to the holding of Judge Falconer in Schweppes, it is not accepted in courts
which have been more liberal in encouraging parody. "The 'parody' branch of the 'fair
use' doctrine is itself a means of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law."
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that the character Ralph Hinkley, the principle figure in the television series "The
Greatest American Hero," did not infringe copyright on Superman). See generally M.
NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 13.05[c].
" Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 185 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd
per curiain by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1957) (Douglas, J. abstaining),
reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958). For a general discussion of the parody defense in
U.S. copyright law see A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSUBRG, COPYRIGHT FOR
THE NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 626-41 (3d ed. 1989).
65 131 F. Supp. at 185.
66 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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Here to Obscurity" by Sid Caesar. Judge Carter held that there was no
infringement of copyright because "[s]ome limited taking should be per-
mitted under the doctrine of fair use, in the case of burlesque, to bring
about [the] recalling or conjuring up of the original. '8 7 Indeed, Judge
Carter went so far as to add that "[t]he doctrine of fair use permits
burlesque to go somewhat farther so long as the taking is not
substantial." 8
Judge Carter's statement concerning the amount of material that
may be legitimately copied in a "fair use" such as parody is comparable
to the amount the British court allows under its equivalent doctrine of
"fair dealing." "This' defence [of fair dealing] only arises where it is
first established that a substantial part of the work has been taken..
"9 The "fair dealing" defence in British common law"0 also exists in
the United States. In the 1976 Copyright Act,7 1 criticism is mentioned
as a type of "fair use", and parody is regarded as a form of criticism.
72
The legislative notes relating to the fair use doctrine listed exam-
ples of the "sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use under
the circumstances.17 3 Congress indicated that one of these activities is
"use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied. 71 4 Par-
ody, however, was "not classified as a presumptively fair use," and
thus, an assertion of the parody defense "must be considered individu-
ally, in light of the statutory factors, reason, experience, and, of course,
the general principles developed in past cases."7 5
There is a growing awareness by United States courts that the
parody defense is generally legitimate. To cite one example, in Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,7e the song "I Love New
York" was sung on the show "Saturday Night Live" as "I Love
Sodom." The Second Circuit held that the parody was "fair use" be-
17 Id. at 350.
68 Id.
69 See 8 HALSBURtY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 788 (3d ed. 1954). For more on the
meaning of "substantial part," see 9 HALSBURY'S LAWs 921 (4th ed. 1985).
70 See W. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 363-64 (1981).
11 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
712 LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 242 (6th ed. 1986).
11 NOTES OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.
74 Id.
"I New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517,
1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986)). See
also Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980) (court
must examine the facts of each case).
7' 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1980).
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cause the parody did not affect the value of plaintiff's song. "Even more
extensive use would still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon
the original, using the original as a known element of modern culture
and contributing something new for humorous effect or commentary.""
Only when the parodic work competes directly with the original
work in the same market should the parody defense be unavailable. As
long as the work is found to be a parody and not simply an unautho-
rized reproduction, the parody defense should be upheld unless the par-
ody is a product that will be sold in the plaintiffs' market. Thus, in a
recent case,7 Zomba, the maker of a music-video starring D.J. Jazzy
Jeff, claimed that the video entitled "A Nightmare on My Street" was
protected "fair use." Zomba claimed that the purpose and nature of the
video's copying of the movie "A Nightmare on Elm Street" and of the
movie's character Freddy, was parody. The court, distinguishing
Zomba's use of the borrowed material from the defendant's use of the
material in Elsmere,79 held that while more extensive copying is per-
mitted in creating a parody than in creating other types of fictional and
dramatic works, in the instant case "Zomba stands to profit financially
by using Freddy without making the usual licensing arrangements."8
Central to the court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction was the
fact that the plaintiffs had already granted the rights to make a deriva-
tive work (a music-video by the group "The Fat Boys") which would
be in direct competition with the D.J. Jazzy Jeff video.
5. TRADEMARK PARODY ALLOWED UNLESS IT RESULTS IN
CONFUSION As To SOURCE
The owners of a trademark have legitimate reasons to protect their
trademark from infringement. A considerable economic investment is
involved in the promotion of the good will associated with a trademark.
Schweppes' advertising, for example, is conducted by Ogilvy & Mather
in the United States (who also advertise for Rolls-Royce) and Schwep-
pes spends a considerable amount of money on advertising.8' However,
77 Id., 623 F.2d at 253 n.1.
7' New Line Cinema v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
79 Id. at 1529 (citing to Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.) affg per curiam 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1980)).
80 Id. at 1526.
81 Some of Schweppes' promotions include an advertisement by the Chess Cham-
pion Anatoly Karpov, and others feature Dobbs the butler who shores up a Duke's
declining fortune. "The duke personifies [Schweppes], said Nancy McNally, account
supervisor at Ammiratis & Puris, New York. He recognizes quality and expects the
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not every product or mark that is similar to another trademark is an
infringement. For example, Lever Brothers "has spent $30 million in
promoting 'Snuggle' fabric softener" which involved promoting the im-
age of a "Snuggle" bear.82 When Lever Brothers sought an injunction
against Mattel for manufacturing a "Snuggles the Seal" stuffed doll
marketed for children, Judge Motley found that (1) there was no likeli-
hood of confusion and (2) there was no misappropriation because the
plaintiff had no trademark in the word "Snuggle" as applied to all
stuffed animals.
8 3
best .... ." Giges, Hot Weather Breeds Promotions; Smaller Soda Brands Make Sum-
mer Plans, ADVERTISING AGE, April 27, 1987, at 10. The trade journal ADVERTISING
AGE judged ads by Schweppes to be amongst the ten best ads of all time.
2 Lever Brothers Co. v. Mattel, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1395, 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
83 Id. at 1401. Any action involving a claim of trademark infringement, dilution
or disparagement is only valid if the defendant has made commercial use of the trade-
mark owner's mark, slogan or symbol. No trademark action can be brought against
someone for non-commercial use of a trademark such as David Letterman's parody of
Lever Brother's trademark in his "Top 10 Fears of Snuggle the Fabric Softener Bear":
1) The Pillsbury Dough Boy will ask him to poke lower; 2) Too much fabric softener
will prevent him from functioning as a male; 3) Something will happen to George
Bush; 4) Smokey the Bear will get drunk and tell him that he should be the Fabric
Softener Bear; 5) He'll end up in the washer with Al Sharpton's T-Shirts; 6) The
company will fix him so that he remains "snuggly" forever; 7) The fear that he'll have
to chew his leg off to get free from a trap, etc. (from Late Night with David Letterman,
November 29, 1988). The following night Mr. Letterman quipped that "For the
Michelin Man, using a condom is kind of superfluous."
Other trademarks involving a heavily promoted character include the Pillsbury
Doughboy, Charlie the Tuna, Morris the Cat, Frank and Ed Jaymes of Bartles &
James wine cooler fame, Life cereal's Mikey, Ronald McDonald, Kellog's Tony the
Tiger, and the California Raisin Advisory Board's animated raisins. See Johnson, Out-
takes: Soft Sell, The L.A. Times, April 26, 1987, (Calendar), at 18. See also Walt
Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (parodic
use of copyrighted "Mickey Mouse March" in the film "The Life and Times of the
Happy Hooker" was not a "fair use," in part because defendants' repetitive use ex-
ceeded the amount necessary to "conjure [it] up"); Walt Disney Productions v. Air
Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (The parody of Mickey Mouse was found to be copy-
right infringement because the characters were copied. The court found the taking too
extensive since the Walt Disney characters are easy to "conjure up" without much
copying, but rejected plaintiff's claims of trademark infringement and disparagement.).
When the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences used a woman dressed as
Snow White in the 1989 Academy Awards without authorization, the Walt Disney
Company sued. The academy apologized and stipulated it would not re-use the seg-
ment. "In another segment of the awards show, Robin Williams, dressed as a giant
mouse, made comments about Disney's chairman, Michael Eisner. 'We think Robin's
use was fair parody,' Mr. Okun [the vice president of corporate communications at
Disney] said." Harmetz, An Apology to Disney, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1989, at C19, col.
4. 'Fair parody' would seem to be a conflation of the 'parody defense' and the statutory
'fair use' doctrine from which the parody defense derives.
For more on the special problems that these fictional characters bring to the law,
see Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. REV.
429 (1986).
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In contrast to copyright law, the thrust of trademark law is to
protect the consumer from confusion as to source. A non-confusing par-
ody of a famous mark is not a trademark infringement because the
owner of the mark "does not own in gross the penumbral customer
awareness of its name, nor the fallout from its advertising." 4 Where
there is parody there is generally no confusion as to source. When,
however, a trademark is copied without parody, confusion would result
in the mind of the consumer as to the source of the product or service.
Thus, in Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., a typ-
ical trademark case turning on the issue of confusion as to source,
Quality Inns was enjoined from using the name "McSleep Inns" for a
hotel chain.8 5 The District Court held that: (1) McDonald's has a
property right to the "Mc" prefix; (2) there is likelihood of confusion
as to source; and (3) defendants made a "deliberate attempt to benefit
by the goodwill and reputation of McDonald's." 8
Applying the rationale of Quality Inns to the Schweppes case leads
to the conclusion that (1) Schweppes has a property right in the
Schweppes Tonic Water label and name; (2) there is no likelihood of
confusion between Schweppes and Schlurppes since the two names are
readily distinguishable and the two products would be sold in com-
pletely disparate markets; 7 and (3) it is unlikely that defendants were
attempting to benefit from the goodwill and reputation of Schweppes
84 Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D.N.M.
1985), affd, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (the parody of Jordache Jeans by a
"Lardashe" label for a brand of jeans for larger women held not a trademark
infringement).
88 Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., Civ. No. PN-87-2606 (D. Md.
1988)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
8' Id. The Lanham Act prohibits any "false description or representation" of ori-
gin. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Even identical marks are not likely to confuse if
products and channels of trade are sufficiently different. See J. GILSON, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.01 at 5-6 (1984).
The Seventh Circuit has held that 'if the same trademark is used in an
unrelated field, there is no likelihood of confusion.' Blazon, Inc. v. Balzon
Mobile Homes Corp., 416 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1969). This is, of
course, only a general proposition that may not hold in the face of a
strong, famous trademark. See, e.g., Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4
F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (finding name "Rolls-Royce" for a radio tube
company infringes on trademark of automobile manufacturer).
McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Productions, 225 U.S.P.Q. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(maker of Tron fuses lost claim that movie "Tron" violated the Illinois anti-dilution
statute and infringed its rights in the TRON trademark).
87 It is supposed that confusion would exist only if the change in the characters of
the word Schweppes was so small as to be insignificant. See Les Parfums de Dana, Inc.
v. Novoa Cosmetics Ltd, No. 81 Civ. 6653 (S.D.N.Y. October 4, 1982) (Judge Motley)
(available on LEXIS) (where plaintiffs (marketers of DANA perfume) enjoined de-
fendant from producing a DAMA perfume on a finding of trademark infringement).
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because "Schlurppes" sounds "funny," and the parody pokes fun at the
very name copied. This third factor might be particularly important
because without this element of humor, the parody defense would be
invalid.88
The owner of a trademark has the exclusive right to exploit the
mark. Thus, the parody defense cannot be used to justify freeloading.
Where there is actual confusion as to source, or where the jurisdiction
has an anti-dilution89 or anti-disparagement" statute, the trademark
owner can successfully enjoin the infringer. The mere parody of a
trademark, however, where there is little if any potential economic
harm, should not be enjoined by the court. In judging a case involving
the parody defense, a court should attempt to strike a balance among
88 "Defendant's variation on ... plaintiff's illustration does not, without an ele-
ment of humor aimed at some aspect of the illustration itself, render it a parody and
therefor a fair use of plaintiff's work." Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F.
Supp. 706, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also, supra note 14. But cf., Comment, supra
note 32. "[Ilt is difficult to see how the 'Schlurppes' enterprise could ever pass as par-
ody. It was a strongly allusive imitation of the plaintiff's work, and it was not without
its humorous aspect; but it was not so much an attempt to ridicule or poke fun at the
plaintiff's product as an attempt to cash in upon consumer familiarity with the plain-
tiff's product as a means of enhancing the defendants' sales of their own produce." Id.
at 247-48.
The dissent of Judge Mansfield in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1981) supports the proposition stated in the text. "The humorous twist would not exist
if the 'boogie woogie' sound of the original (incidentally not copyrighted) were not
recalled. The whole point of the fair use defense is to allow some use of the copyrighted
material." Id. at 190. MCA, Inc. concerned the production of defendant's "Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C." The majority found that plaintiffs and defendants were
both competitors in the entertainment field and that defendant's parody was not a fair
use of plaintiff's song because it was not a parody of plaintiff's song or a parody of the
music of the 40's but simply the substitution of lyrics for commercial gain. "While
commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider
whether the alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private com-
mercial gain." Id. at 182.
Humor is also a defense to a suit in libel. Salomone v. MacMillan Pub. Co., 97
Misc. 2d 346, 350, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 77 A.D.2d 501, 429
N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Div. 1978). Compare the strategic use of humor in the argument
made to the Supreme Court by Alan L. Isaacman, Flynt's attorney, in Hustler Maga-
zine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Hustler printed a parody of a Campari Li-
queur advertisement that depicted evangelist Jerry Falwell as a hypocrite and a drunk-
ard, "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time." The United States Supreme Court
struck down a jury award of $200,000. "Hustler has every right to say that man
[Falwell] is full of b.s ..... Hustler is saying: 'Let's deflate this stuffed shirt ... and
bring him down to our level,' a comment that caused several justices to collapse in
laughter." Savage, Hustler-Falwell Case Enlivens High Court, L.A. Times, Dec. 3,
1987, § 1, at 4, col. 1. "Alan L. Isaacman wanted to make the Supreme Court laugh,
and he did." Abrams, Court Jester; How a Beverly Hills Attorney Got the Supreme
Court to Laugh, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, § 5, at 1, col. 2. See infra note 142 and
accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
0 See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
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the interests of the owner of the trademark, the interests of the parodist
to express itself and the interests of the public to receive the parody's
entertainment value, message, satiric comment or criticism. The equita-
ble doctrine involved in trademark infringement cases and the doctrines
of "fair use" (in the United States) or "fair dealing" (in Britain) re-
quire that only the unfair use of a registered trademark, which exists
when the parody is sold in the same market as the original and can
serve as a substitute for the original, should be adjudicated as an in-
fringement of the mark.
5.1. Dilution
The concept of trademark dilution originated in England when a
British court prohibited the trademark "Kodak" from being used on
bicycles.9" Although the sale of "Kodak" bicycles for photographers was
unlikely to mislead consumers into believing the bicycles were associ-
ated with the camera manufacturer, the British court found that the
distinctiveness of the "Kodak" mark would be lessened in the public's
mind by its association with products other than the cameras of its
owner.
In the United States, the theory of trademark dilution was devel-
oped, most notably, in an article by Schecter in 1927.92 The Lanham
Act does not recognize the dilution theory of trademark protection, but
approximately half the states have enacted "anti-dilution" statutes.9
The dilution statute of New York, for example, states that the "likeli-
hood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief
in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in
cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services."' The legislative intent was to curb "the whittling
' Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898). See Lighi,
Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REV.
615, 615 (1979).
92 Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv.
813, 824-30 (1927).
, "See Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Anal-
ysis, 72 VA. L. Rzv. 1079, 1087 (1986), reprinted in 77 TRADEMARK RE'. 177
(1987). See also, Pattishall, supra note 28.
" N.Y. GFN. Bus. LAW, § 368-d (McKinney 1984) (emphasis added). In Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), Judge Haight enjoined defendant Hollywood Creations' replica of
the American Express Card containing a condom and the phrase "NEVER LEAVE
HOME WITHOUT IT" not under the federal trademark statute but under New
York's anti-dilution statute, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
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away of an established trade-mark's selling power and value through
its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products.""5
The dilution principle protects owners of a trademark from unau-
thorized imitation of the trademark even in areas where there is no
"common field of activity."96 The idea behind this type of protection is
that a trade name such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Tiffany or Schwep-
pes is worthy of protection from any unauthorized use that would
lessen the mark's "distinctiveness." Thus, the dilution principle is sepa-
rate from the traditional "confusion" definition of infringement of a
trademark.
An important distinction in a discussion of trademark parody is
whether or not the parody is itself a use of the trademark as trademark.
One example of the parody being itself a trademark is Gucci Shops,
Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc.9 In this case, diaper bags bearing the
GUCCI green-red-green diagonal stripes and the legend GUCCHI
GOO were found by the court to infringe the GUCCI trademark. A
dilution violation was suggested by the court in a footnote.98 The court
held that a validly established trademark may be protected from ridi-
cule which rises to the level of infringement of the mark. Judge Motley
found it "not unreasonable to assume that defendant's use of the
GUCCHI mark and the stripe on the 'diaper bag' would mislead
members of the public into believing that plaintiff is somehow con-
nected with the 'diaper bag.' ""
In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,100 defendant, pub-
lisher of "High Society" magazine, published a "prurient parody of
Bean's famous catalog," entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-
Catalog." ' 1 The District Court of Maine held that the parody was not
protected from injunction under Maine's trademark dilution statute.'
0 2
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the lower court,
stating that "the district court's injunction [of the parody] falls not only
911 See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
538, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977) (citing to N.Y. Legis. Ann., 1954, p.
49) for an example of the statute's application.
98 See infra text accompanying notes 113-21 for more on common field of activity.
" 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
98 Id. at 840 n.6.
9 Id. at 840.
100 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986) (injunction issued), rev'd, 811 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 3254 (1987).
101 Id. 811 F.2d at 27.
103 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1964). The statute provides: "Likeli-
hood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive mark under this
chapter ... shall be a ground for injunctive relief, notwithstanding the absence of a
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of the
goods or services." Id.
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because it trammels upon a protected form of expression, but also be-
cause it depends upon an untoward judicial evaluation of the offensive-
ness or unwholesomeness of the appellant's materials."'13
The parody defense is legitimate unless the parodic product com-
petes directly with the original product, in the same market, and can
serve as a substitute for the original product. The dilution principle,
though, ignores the question of whether or not there is direct competi-
tion between the plaintiff's and the defendant's product. However, the
dilution principle is not part of United States or British copyright or
trademark statutes and is only applicable in the United States in states
which have enacted an anti-dilution statute.0 While the name
Schlurppes may "dilute" the name Schweppes, no dilution statute ap-
plies and thus dilution is not a relevant issue in determining the out-
come of the Schweppes case.
5.2. Disparagement
Claims of trademark disparagement have not been extremely suc-
cessful in the United States. The reason for this is that trademark law
requires "that a likely confusion as to source, sponsorship or affiliation
must be proven, which is not the same thing as a 'right' not to be made
fun of."'  Disparagement was an issue, however, in a case involving a
parody of the slogan, "Where there's life, there's Bud." The defendant
in the case was enjoined from using as a slogan for his combination
floor wax and insecticide the phrase, "Where there's life, there's bugs."
The court noted that the plaintiff has "a property interest in the slogan,
built up at great expense, and that it and its products are favorably
known as a result of its use of this property right." 1081 Florida law did
103 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d at 33-34 (1st. Cir. 1987).
104 The U.S. Trademark Association ("U.S.T.A.") began a study of the Lanham
Act in 1985. U.S.T.A. gave its recommendations to the Senate and the House. The
National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") stated that three short proposals could
have posed serious First Amendment problems. The clauses concerning the prohibition
of "dilution" and "tarnishment and disparagement" of trademarks posed "serious First
Amendment implications." The NAB stated that the anti-dilution clause would allow
"owners of 'Coca-Cola-type' trademarks to sue over satire, consumer reports and edito-
rial matter.... In a letter to the NAB, the subcommittee said that in the committee
report on the bill it will state that the legislation is not intended to affect satire, con-
sumer reporting or editorials." Prior Restraints Taken From Bill, 12 THE NEWS ME-
DIA & THE LAW 49 (Spring 1988) (referring to S. 1883 and H.R. 4156).
105 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31.38, at 670
(2d ed. 1984) (cited with approval in Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F.
Supp. 48, 55 (D.N.M. 1985)).
108 Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1962).
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not require actual confusion between the two products'"7 and the court
held that the defendant's use of "a deceptively similar slogan in a man-
ner that will bring direct financial loss to the plaintiff,. . . by reason of
the peculiarly unwholesome association of ideas when the word 'bugs'
was substituted in the slogan for the word 'Bud'," '' was sufficient for
an injunction.
While the "Bud" case above was decided in favor of the plaintiff,
cases brought under a disparagement claim are often won by the de-
fendant. For example, the owner of the trademark "Betty Crocker"
was denied a temporary injunction under the Lanham Act against a
defendant who published a cookbook with the title, "Betty Cooker's
Crock Book for Drunks." In this case, the court held that the Lanham
Act requires proof of some confusion."0 9 Another example of a success-
ful defendant was the use of "Lardashe" as a trademark to identify a
commercial product, which defendant characterized as 'jeans for larger
women." The district court held that the use of the trademark did not
interfere with the "Jordache" mark since there was no likelihood of
confusion."
One writer has commented that if the parody is used to make a
social comment, as well as entertain, the chances of success in defending
against a claim are good. However, if the purpose of the use is simply
to advertise a directly competitive product, the parody justification is
less compelling."' Given this limited requirement for the parody de-
fense-that the parody make a social comment and entertain-it is cer-
tain that the parody defense will continue to gain prominence in the
United States because "trademarks have become a natural target of sat-
irists who seek to comment on this integral part of the national cul-
ture."1 1 2 The claim that another has "disparaged" an owner's trade-
107 Id. 306 F.2d at 438.
108 Id. at 437.
109 General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
110 "[W]here a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing mark, the intent is
not necessarily to confuse the public but rather to amuse. See Note, Tradenark Par-
ody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 n.4
(1986) (the purpose of a parody is 'to create a comic or satiric contrast to a serious
work,)." Jordache Enter. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.
1987), affg, 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985).
I See Kane, Developments in the Law of Trademark Parody: If It's Funny,
Does That Mean It's Fair?, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION 263, 272 (P.L.I. 1984).
1 ..2 Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copy-
right: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923, 939 (1986). See L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986) (injunction issued), rev'd,
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.) (injunction against "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog"
held improper), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 3254 (1987); Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
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mark through parody in a way that requires an injunction has not met
with success in United States courts.
5.3. Passing Off
Passing off, as defined in British case law, is similar to the eight
factor test used in the United States.11 As in the United States, a
trademark infringement action in Britain does not preclude the proprie-
tor of a mark from proceeding with an action for "passing off."'"
The issue of a "common field of activity" has been a significant
Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158; Note, supra note 110.
Note that the parody defense was unsuccessful in the following cases: Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986), affd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 326 (1988) (defendant barred from selling "Mutant of
Omaha" T-Shirts to dramatize his concerns about nuclear war); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (Prelimi-
nary injunction against infringement of copyrighted poster of Dallas Cowboy cheer-
leaders granted. Infringing poster showed five ex-cheerleaders with bare breasts. The
parody fair use defense was rejected.); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (likeli-
hood of association with the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader was found where defendant's
"Debbie Does Dallas" pornographic movie featured performers wearing uniforms
simulating Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader uniforms. Dilution found in footnote. Id. 604
F.2d at 204 n.8. "Where defense of 'parody' is invoked in bad faith to justify a substan-
tial copying of the original, the defense will be rejected." Id. 467 F. Supp. at 375
(citations omitted) (this case was criticized by Denicola, who stated that "the sweeping
rejection of the defendant's first amendment claim ... is dangerously simplistic." Den-
icola, supra at 206)).
11' The British test comes from the "Advocaat" case. Erven Warnink BV v.
Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] App. Cas. 731. The characteristics of "passing
off" are:
i) a misrepresentation
ii) made by a trader in the course of trade
iii) to prospective customers
iv) which is calculated to injure the goodwill or business of another or the
likelihood thereof and
v) which causes actual damage to that other or likelihood thereof.
J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 216.
In the United States, courts generally rely on the eight factor test of Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
820 (1961): 1) strength of mark; 2) degree of similarity of marks 3) proximity of the
products' channel of trade; 4) quality of defendant's products; 5) actual confusion; 6)
defendant's good faith in adopting mark; 7) sophistication of buyers; 8) bridging the
gap-will the plaintiff be entering the market or has the plaintiff licensed to that mar-
ket already? This same test was adopted in McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc.,
599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979).
See also 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5.2, at
133 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the parallel development of English and American com-
mon law relating to unfair competition or "passing off" in the eighteenth century).
114 Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 2; Jay v. Ladler, 40 Ch.D.
649 (1888). See J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 204. For commentary on the elements of
"passing off," see HALISBURY'S STATUTES, at 48 (4th ed. 1988) and 48 HALISBURY'S
LAws at para. 144 et seq. (4th ed. 1984).
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one in British trademark law."1 5 Judge Falconer (who decided the
Schlurppes case) has concluded that a "common field of activity" is
evidence of the likelihood of public confusion."' 6 Likelihood of confu-
sion is the single most important element in a claim of "passing off" in
both the United States and Britain. The likelihood of confusion test
used in Britain was stated by Lord Halsbury in Schweppes v. Gib-
bens:11  "The whole question in these cases is whether the
thing-taken in its entirety looking at the whole thing-is such that in
the ordinary course of things a person with reasonable apprehension
and with proper eyesight would be deceived." ' 8
The British court requires a common field of activity for a claim
of "passing off" to be successful. For example, in a recent case,119
plaintiff was the licensee of the copyright on fictional characters called
"Wombles" who inhabited Wimbledon Common for the purpose of
keeping it clean. The defendant, without permission, used the term
"Wombles" to identify its "skips" (small containers used at construc-
tion sites for garbage). The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for
passing off:
[W]here what is alleged is that one person is passing off his
goods or his business ... as the business of somebody else,
there must be a common field of activity. It seems to me that
that common field of activity may be one which is actual, in
which case there is no room for any possibility of argument
at all, or it may be one ... which is not actual, but which is
reasonably to be assumed by the reasonable man from the
use of the same or a similar name. 20
Applying this to the Schlurppes case, a claim against defendants of
"passing off" would surely fail since bubble bath and soda are commer-
cial products too disparate to be considered marketed in a common
field.
The principle of a common field of activity has at times been cru-
cial to claims of passing off in the United States. Judge Learned Hand,
for example, would not find infringement where there was no competi-
tion in a common market: "There is always the danger that we may be
115 McCulloch v. May, Ltd., 65 R.P.C. 58 (Ch. 1948) (per Judge Wynn-Parry).
... Lego System Aktieselstab v. Lego M Lemelstrich, 1983 Fleet Street Rep. 155
(1982). See J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 222.
217 22 R.P.C. 601 (1905).
118 Id. at 607.
119 Wombles Ltd. v. Wombles Skips Ltd., 1977 R.P.C. 99 (Ch. 1975).
120 Id. at 101 (quoted in E. KITcH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PRocEss 369 (3d ed. 1986)).
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merely granting a monopoly, based upon the notion that by advertising
one can obtain some 'property' in a name." '121
There is a close relationship between copyright actions and "pass-
ing off" in borderline areas such as labels and trademark designs. If all
Wellingtons had done was to build up an atmosphere by relating the
upper-class aspects and goodwill of Schweppes Tonic Water to Wel-
lingtons bubble bath, by reproducing in substantial part the Schweppes
label, then there would have been infringement of copyright. In such an
instance Wellingtons would clearly have been enjoined if it was likely
consumers would be confused into thinking that the bubble bath was a
product manufactured or in some way sponsored by Schweppes. How-
ever, it is unlikely that a consumer would be so confused because the
name Schlurppes is clearly a parody of the name Schweppes. Further,
bubble bath is not an item in the same channel of trade as tonic water.
6. FAIR USE AND FAIR DEALING
United States copyright law derives from the Constitution which
provides that, "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors ...the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ...
According to one legal scholar "[t]he goal of the constitutional grant is
to increase public access to the expression of authors, and ultimately to
serve society's interest in the free flow of ideas and information.'1
3
Copyright law in the United States accommodates the interests of both
parodists and copyright holders through the doctrine of "fair use.' 24
This doctrine provides some guidance in the trademark area as well.'25
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 26 the
12 S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940). This
analysis was modified in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). See supra note 113.
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
122 Tasker, Parody or Satire as a Defense to Trademark Infringement, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 216, 227 (1987). See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
124 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text for a reference to the pertinent House Report. See generally Bern-
stein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1
(1984).
125 See Tasker, supra note 123, for a discussion of the limitations involved in
applying copyright "fair use" doctrine to trademark law.
126 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (reversing a holding of infringement in 659 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir. 1981)). For commentary on the case see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM L. REV. 1600 (1982), reprinted in 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 253 (1983); Note,
supra note 8.
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United States Supreme Court held that the "fair use" exception applied
to defendant manufacturers of video-cassette machines because plaintiff
film producers had not demonstrated the potential economic harm of
time-shifting on the market for their works. In Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter.,"' the Supreme Court declared the eco-
nomic harm to the work's potential market "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use."12
"Fair dealing" (the British equivalent to the United States concept
of fair use) is a defense to an allegation of copyright infringement in
Britain.12 9 "Fair dealing" allows for the quotation of a copyrighted
work in a critique so long as sufficient acknowledgment is given of the
work criticized.' s°
A recent article lists five meanings of the parody defense in trade-
mark infringement cases:
(1) a factor tending to negate a finding of likelihood of pub-
lic confusion as to source, sponsorship or approval; (2) a fac-
tor tending to negate a finding of dilution; (3) a fair use de-
fense imported from copyright law; (4) a First Amendment
defense; and, (5) a fair use defense which is an intrinsic part
of trademark law.'
Although a parody may at first glance be taken for the genuine
article, especially in a case such as Schweppes where a label is involved,
this momentary impression merely adds to the parody's effectiveness
and further inspection dispels the confusion. A parody will typically
differ from the original in a humorous or grotesque way so that the
average consumer is unlikely to believe that the parody comes from or
is sponsored by the trademark owner.' 32 SCHLURPPES TONIC
BUBBLE BATH is a legitimate parody of SCHWEPPES TONIC
WATER: it is a "fair use" of the mark since it copies the mark in
order to produce a parody. In the United States the parody defense
would have been valid in a trademark infringement cause of action be-
cause there is no likelihood of confusion between the two products.
The problem with the British "substantial" test is that the ques-
tion of whether a "substantial" amount has been copied is too indeter-
127 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (parody was not classified as presumptively fair use).
128 Id. at 566.
'29 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, §§ 6(2), 9(2).
130 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 6(10).
... ... Tasker, supra note 123, at 216.
132 See Shaughnessy, supra note 93, at 1093. See also Pattishall, Dawning Accept-
ance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADE-
MARK REP. 289 (1984).
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minate.133 Such a test ignores the fact that a successful parody may
copy a "substantial" amount and still merit a parody defense against an
action to enjoin the parody. The crux of the problem is that copyright
only pertains to expression, not ideas. Parodies are often the objects of
litigation because they do indeed copy protected expressions and the
unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material is infringement. In
parody, however, while the material expression is indeed copied, the
idea of the parody is different from the idea of the material parodied.
The similarity of the parodied material to the parody is a superficial
similarity-the meaning, the idea, the intended audience and the mes-
sage of the parody are different. Parody only copies as a means of ef-
fecting its satiric purpose; it uses, not simply reproduces material, in
order to effectively comment on it, thereby placing the object of satire in
a different context so that something new and original is produced. The
result of this transposition is parody and satire. Parody is different
from both "passing off" and misappropriation and is not an infringe-
ment of either copyright or trademark. This difference is one that
courts must recognize. Something of value is lost when this difference is
ignored, and, as a result, an original and entertaining parody is en-
joined rather than enjoyed.
7. CONCLUSION
Since a successful parody will inevitably copy the original to some
extent, in order for parodies to be allowed at all, a parody defense must
be recognized as a legitimate shield to a prima facie finding of infringe-
ment. If the judicial test is to be simply stated as: Is there a substantial
copying?-as Judge Falconer seems to imply-then equity is far from
guaranteed. "Substantial," as can be seen from the volume of litigation
133 Copying less than the whole of a work is still infringement if a "substantial
part" is copied. Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, § 49(l). See SiIlitoe v.
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983 Fleet Street Rep. 545 (Ch. 1982) (a large proportion of
a work is a "substantial part"); University of London Press v. University Tutorial
Press, [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 610 ("what is worth copying [of a commercial work] is prima
facie worth protecting" per Judge Peterson); Express Newspapers Plc v. Liverpool
Daily Post & Echo Plc, 1985 Fleet Street Rep. 306 (one seven-hundredth of a literary
work was a "substantial part" per Judge Whitford); Spelling-Goldberg Pro., Inc. v.
B.P.C. Publishing, 1981 R.P.C. 283 (even a tiny feature of a work may well be a
"substantial part" if it possesses key features by which the whole is identified or recog-
nized); J. PHILLIPS, supra note 12, at 153.
Problems with the "substantially similar" test have been recognized in the United
States by courts and by commentators. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1983); Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The
Protective Scope of the Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding
Parodies, 12 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 229, 233 (1988). See generally 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 9, at § 13.03 (discussing notion of substantial similarity).
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surrounding the word in a corporate context,'34 is a murky term. The
parody defense offers a way of testing the motivation behind, and the
modality of, the copying. The issue of whether the allegedly infringing
work is a parody or not is primarily a matter of fact but will take on a
legal definition in the courtroom. Parody is no more easily defined.. 5
than any other literary or artistic genre, but a jury is as capable of
determining whether or not a work is a parody as it is of determining
whether or not the amount of copied material is "substantial." Whether
a work is a parody may even be a less difficult judgment for the judge
or jury than whether a "substantial amount" of the original has been
copied. An additional question for the fact finder is whether or not the
parody has copied more than necessary in order to "conjure up the
original." 13 6
If a court determines that a work is a parody of copyrighted mate-
rial, there are several additional factors to consider. The Sony case137
held that one of the factors to consider after the initial finding that a
work is a parody is whether the parody directly competes with the mar-
ket for the original copyrighted material. If the parody is in direct com-
petition with the original, Sony holds that it must be considered an
infringement. If it is not in direct competition, then, since there is no
economic harm, the parody of the copyrighted material may not be
enjoined. 38
134 See, e.g., Gimbel v. Signal Co., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd per
curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (shareholder suit revolved around the
meaning of the sale of "all or substantially all" of a corporation's assets).
"I Compare Justice Stewart's remark on the difficulty of defining obscenity, "I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced with that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligi-
bly doing so. But [sic] I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
136 See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348,
350 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ("Some limited taking should be permitted under the doctrine of
fair use, in the case of burlesque, to bring about... [the] recalling or conjuring up of
the original.") The problem with the "conjure up" standard is that if only enough was
taken to conjure up the original then there would probably be no infringement in the
first place and thus no need for the parody defense of fair use.
13. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See
supra note 126 and accompanying text.
1 Lower courts have held that the potential for economic harm is also determina-
tive. D.C. Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (Holder of copyrights to "Superman" and "Wonder Woman" brought suit
against a singing telegram franchiser and franchisee on the ground that the defendants'
skits featuring "Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" violated plaintiff's copyrights. In
rejecting the parody defense and finding that defendants' use was not fair, the court
found that defendants' business infringed on plaintiff's potential market. "There is a
clear potential market for genuine SUPERMAN singing telegrams ... and plaintiff
has the ability to exploit that market. Whether or not plaintiff now exploits that mar-
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IN DEFENSE OF PARODY
Trademarks are symbols of corporate good will, and vast amounts
of money are spent to promote the trademarks of a corporate source.
Some courts and state legislatures have developed legal principles of
"dilution" and "disparagement" in trademark law. A parody of a
trademark can be seen as causing harm even without the factor of di-
rect market competition.
Unless special protective legislation is contolling, however, parody
of a trademark should not be enjoined simply because it dilutes or dis-
parages the original trademark. Free speech issues should be determi-
native.139 The mere fact that a corporation has spent a good deal of
money on a trademark does not of itself require that courts enjoin hu-
morous satire of the trademark. It is nowhere provided that the more
money that is spent on an item of intellectual property, the greater the
shield from satiric criticism. Indeed, the more the public is exposed to
ket, the effect of defendants' practices upon plaintiff's potential market is clear: they
satisfy demand, at least in part, and create competition for plaintiff as a potential en-
trant." Id. at 118).
The issue of economic harm is central to trademark law as well. See Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.
Ga. 1986) (Merchandiser of "Garbage Pail Kids" stickers sold with gum injured owner
of Cabbage Patch Kids mark and thus enjoined). Judge Tidwell stated there is "a fine
line between parody and piracy" and found the stickers were "an attempt to make
money." Id. at 1034. "The infringement case was settled with an agreement to change
the Garbage Pail Kids so as not to parody the Cabbage Patch Kids as closely as Topps
was doing." Discount Store News, Mar. 16, 1987, at 77, col. 3. But cf., Tetley, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Court refused to en-
join sale of a sticker that satirically parodied plaintiff's "Tetley" and "The Tiny Little
Tea Leaf Tea" marks on a sticker for "Petley's Tiny Little Flea Bags." The stickers
also depicted a box resembling the Tetley Tea box with the sayings, "40 Flea Bags,"
"Orange Pekingese Fleas," and "Tiny Little Dog Fleas", accompanied by a picture of
a scratching dog. Held: Trademark not infringed or diluted since no economic harm).
139 In Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 718
F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989), defendant published
Spy Notes, a parody of Cliffs Notes which poked fun both at certain novels -Tama
Janowitz's Slaves of New York, Bret Ellis's Less Than Zero and Jay McInerney's
Bright Lights, Big City - and Cliffs Notes. Judge Shirley Wohl Kram enjoined de-
fendant from distributing Spy Notes under the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125 (likelihood of consumer confusion) using the eight-factor Polaroid test discussed
supra note 113. The injunction was vacated by Judge Feinberg of the Second Circuit
on the grounds that "parody is a form of artistic expression protected by the First
Amendment." Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 493 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment bars recovery for publication of satire unless "actual
malice") and Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting "the broad scope permitted parody in First Amendment law")).
Judge Feinberg's decision in Cliffs Notes followed the Second Circuit's holding in
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) in which Ginger Rogers brought a
Lanham Act claim against the Italian film-maker Federico Fellini for his film entitled
"Ginger and Fred." The Second Circuit found for the defendants in both cases because
where "overextension of the Lanham Act ... might intrude on First Amendment val-
ues, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict." 875 F.2d at 998
(citations omitted).
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advertising by the sponsor of the trademark, the greater the expressive
need the public may have for parody or satire of the trademark.
The public in both the United States and Britain is constantly ex-
posed to the trade names of producers of goods and services and their
advertisements. 141 It is in the public interest not to have every instance
of satiric criticism or parody of a trademark quashed through injunc-
tions. The constructive fair use of parody must be allowed. The typical
individual in modern society is subjected to a continual barrage of ad-
vertising that earnestly tries to sell to the consumer some good or ser-
vice. Some outlet for response to this "solemnity" must be allowed. 41 A
corporation that has marketed and advertised a label, character or mark
to the extent that it has become publicly known should not be entitled
to more protection than a public figure is entitled to in shielding him-
or herself from satiric and humorous criticism." 2 Freedom in the mar-
ketplace requires the liberty to parody intellectual property, even if the
parody itself is a. commercial product. In looking to United States case
law for guidance as to the extent of "fair use" in its determination of
"fair dealing," British courts should not hesitate to recognize the legiti-
mate value of a parody defense.
140 The effectiveness of a recent ad campaign by Schweppes in the United States
can be tested by the reader by whether or not he or she recognizes the term
"Schweppervescence."
141 "[Iun today's world of unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable
to the humor of parody . . . ." Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.) affg per curiam, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1980) ("I love New York" sung by Saturday Night Live actors as "I
Love Sodom" held to be fair use because the parody did not affect the value of plain-
tiff's song). See supra notes 26 and 76-77 and accompanying text.
14 In 1983 Hustler printed a parody of a Campari Liqueur advertisement that
depicted evangelist Jerry Falwell as a hypocrite and a drunkard ("Jerry Falwell talks
about his first time"). The United States Supreme Court struck down a jury award of
$200,000. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, Civ. No. 83-0155-LR (D. Va. April 19,
1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1270, reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (Rehnquist, J.). See supra note 88.
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